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* 
INTRODUCTION2 
During the last three years, there has been an increasing amount of literature 
on private capital inflows to developing countries. In 1992-93, attention focused on 
the  rise  in  such  inflows,  their  causes and  nature.  Gradually,  it  moved  to  their 
potential macroeconomic impact and the policy implications. In 1994-95, following 
events in Mexico,  it has concentrated on the sustainability of the inflows, and the 
policy implications of potential reversal. 
Virtually  all of the studies  have focused on Latin America, though some 
authors have also examined East Asian experiences. Analysis of Eastern Europe is 
extremely  rare  (Calvo,  Sahay and Vegh  1995; Griffith-Jones 1995), and that  of 
Africa is virtually non-existent (with the notable exception of the excellent study by 
Asea and Reinhart 1995). Even the most comprehemive recent analysis and survey 
of the literature (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel 1995) has concluded that there is only 
impressionistic  evidence of private capital inflows to  Sub-Saharan Africa,  where 
“capital inflows have not materialized”. Africa has continued to be analysed from the 
view that most of its capital inflows causing a “Dutch Disease” effect are aid inflows 
(Collier 1994; Younger 1992). Figures quoted in an UNCTAD3  document indicate 
that  Africa’s  relative  share  in  inflows  to  developing  countries  has  declined 
considerably from about 14 per cent in 1982-86 to about 5 per cent in 1992-94. 
The key areas examined in the literature have been the scale and composition 
of capital inflows; their causes and sustainability; their effects on macroeconomic 
stability;  and  their  responsiveness to  policy  measures.  This  paper  analyses  the 
characteristics  of  capital  inflows to  Sub-Saharan Africa  in  each of  these areas, 
showing the similarities and differences with other regions of the developing world. 
A debate is also developing as to the nature of capital Africa should attract.  Scholars 
have warned that short term capital inflows subject to abrupt reversal will be very 
disruptive  to  the  domestic financial sector characterised by  weaknesses (refer  to 
Lipumba  (1994)  and  Calvo  et  al  (1995)).  Some argue  for  FDI  which  is  less 
susceptible to transient financial shocks. But counter arguments have also been made 
that  FDI  is  equally  volatile  as dividends and retained earnings will  be  quickly 
repatriated during a financial crisis. 
’ The  authors  are  grateful  to Andrew  Bvumbe.  lbtahim  Elbadawi,  Stephany  Griffith-Jones.  Richard  Kedey, 
Mohsin  Khan,  Polycarp  Musinguzi.  Stuart  Kufeni,  Benno  Ndulu.  Carmen  Reinhart.  Charles  Ojwiya,  Jonathan 
Leape,  Allister  Moon,  Tim  Lament.  Daudi Sajjabi  for supplying  their valuable  time, opinions,  data and materials 
during  the  preparation  of this  paper:  and  to the Swedish  and  Danish  governments  for funding  earlier  work  on 
capital  flows  to  Africa.  However,  we  remain  responsible  for any  errors  and  misinterpretations  in  the current 
paper. 
‘UNCTAD  document  TD/l/ITNC 3 
However,  it  is  important  at  the  outset  to  emphasise  that  data  on  capital 
inflows  to Africa  are extremely  unreliable.  Data issues in other  regions  have centred 
on  distinguishing  private  from  official  inflows;  gross  and  net  inflows;  short-  from 
long-term;  bank  from  non-bank;  and  debt  from  non-debt.  It  has been  necessary  to 
rely fairly  extensively  on either IMF (IFS), OECD (Financial  Inflows)  or World Bank 
(WDT) data (see Femandez-Arias  and Montiell995).  The data for many SSA nations 
are  more  fundamental:  i.e.  poor  recording  systems  for  virtually  all  capital  inflow 
data,  and  recording  of  many  capital  inflows  in  the  current  account  or  under 
errors/omissions4.  Consequently,  both national  and international  data sets on capital 
inflows  are highly  unreliable.  In addition,  even superficial  comparison  of global  and 
country  data  indicates  huge underestimates  and unreliable  categorisations  of inflows 
in global  data  and particularly  for  the SSA region. 
Additionally,  we need to recognise  that there are diverse experiences  in Africa 
in general.  The  speed and sequencing  of policy  reforms  has varied  across countries 
(refer  Kasekende  and  Martin  (1995)).  Notwithstanding,  the  policy  regime  in  a 
number  of countries  in the region  is currently  more conducive  to both domestic  and 
foreign  investment.  Foreign  exchange  markets  have  been  extensively  liberalised  to 
a point  where  even the capital  account  has been highly  decontrolled.  Some countries 
are  currently  receiving  inflows  which  are  quite  significant  relative  to  GDP  and the 
less  desirable  effects  of  such  inflows  are  emerging.  In  the  recent  past,  Kenya, 
Uganda  and  Zambia  have  experienced  disruptive  effects  originating  from  capital 
inflows.  The  reform  of  the  policy  regime  has  been  frequently  credited  for  the 
resurgence  in capital  inflows  to selected countries in Africa especially  by the IMF and 
World  Banks.  While  domestic  policy  reforms  have,  without  doubt,  contributed  to 
the marked  improvement  of capital  inflow  to Africa,  they  cannot  fully  account  for 
the varied  country  experiences.  It would be quite interesting  to assess the factors that 
have  played  an  important  role  in stimulating  private  inflows  to Africa. 
The  data  problems  will  soon be addressed in  a forth-coming  project  funded 
by  the  Swedish  and  Danish  governments  on  Canital  Inflows  and  Macroeconomic 
Policy  which  will  seek  to  clarify  many  of  these  issues.  Owing  to  data  and  other 
limitations,  the current  paper  is limited  in its scope. It focuses on six countries  which 
have reasonably  reliable  data (Kenya,  South Africa,  Tanzania,  Uganda,  Zambia  and 
Zimbabwe),  and with particular  emphasis  on the experiences  of Uganda,  Zambia  and 
Tanzania  which  witnessed  one of the largest  surge in capital  inflows  over  the period 
with  dramatic  macroeconomic  effects. 
’ Refer to Kasekende.  Katarikawe and Rweikiza  (1995) for a full discussion  of problems relating to compiling 
balance of payments statistics in Uganda. 
* Refer to ‘Private Market Financing for Developing  Countries’ prepared by a staff  team in the Policy 
Development  and Review  Department. 4  - 
SCALE  AND  COMPOSITION  OF PRIVATE CAPITAL INFLOWS 
In absolute terms, the g&  of private capital inflows to other developing 
regions dwarfs inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa. The latest estimates from the World 
Bank, based on capital account and equity/debt inflows, indicate that during 199094, 
inflows averaged more than US$180 billion a year, peaking at about US$240 billion 
in 1993. Of these amounts, as shown in Table 1 below, about US$16 billion a year 
went to SSA countries, peaking at about US$ 18 billion in 1990.6  Even in relation 
to macroeconomic variables such as GDP or exports, inBows to SSA were much 
lower than those to Latin America, East or South Asia. 
’  Source:  World  Bank  IECIF  databases 5 
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8.40  20.70 
81.10  138.20 
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32.50  27.10 
3.20  1.20 
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23.10  20.40 
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90.50  80.00 
-6.40  -7.60 
-16.70  -18.10 
120.80  105.40 
-24.20  -26.20 
-2.30  -1.80 
142.00  118.60 
FDI  0.90  1.90  1.80 
PORTFOLIO  0.00  0.00  0.00 
LT  PRIVATE  -0.03  0.04  -1.40 
MIN  PRIVATE  FLOWS  0.87  1.94  0.40 
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-1.70  -1.80 
-0.60  -0.80 
0.10  0.20 
LT  OFFICIAL  FLOWS  4.70  4.00  4.90  4.10 
GRANTS  10.40  9.60  9.60  8.50 
IMF  -0.30  -0.03  0.00  -0.20 
TOTAL  ALL  FLOWS  18.17  15.05  16.20  15.62 
PROFITS  ON  FDI  -1.70  -1.60  -1.70 
INTEREST  ON  LT  PRIVATE  -1.30  -1.40  -1.50 
MIN  PRIVATE  TRANSFERS  -2.13  -1.06  -2.80 
INTEREST  ON  ST  -0.70  -0.60  -0.60 
INTEREST  ON  LT  OFFICIAL  -2.40  -2.90  -1.80 
MAX  PRIVATE  TRANSFERS  -2.73  -5.02  -3.90 
INTEREST  ON  PNG  -0.30  -0.30  -0.30 
IMF  CHARGES  -0.20  -0.20  -0.20 
TOTAL  NET  TRANSFERS  11.57  8.05  10.10 
NOTE:  A  large  portion  - but  not  all  - of  ST/PNG  inflows  are  private  inflows. 
The  private  inflows/transfers  are  shown  excluding  (minimum)/including 
(maximum)  ST  C PNG 
-0.50  -0.50 
-2.10  -2.40 
-1.68  -4.80 
-0.30  -0.20 
-0.10  -0.10 
10.32  7.85 
SOURCE:World  Bank  IECIF  Database,  January  1995. 6 
The fundamental  reason for the underestimates  of inflows  to SSA in published  global 
databases  (apart  from  the  fact  that  they  do not  show the  most  recent  trends)  is the 
comnosition  of the infIows to many  SSA countries,  which  makes  them much  harder 
to  measure,  and  the  absence  of  recording  systems  for  the  main  types  of  inflows.’ 
Table  2 compares  the composition  of  inflows  for SSA and other  regions. 
TABLE  2:COXPOSITION  OF  PRIVATS  CAPITAL  INFLOWS  TO DSVELOPING 
REGIONS  (%) 
1978-82  1990-93 
Latin  Asia  .  SSA  Latfa  Asia  SSA 
America 
Amex-i  ca 




Bank  loans 
Short-Term 
loans 
4.9  3.6  0.0  68.1  14.2  10.9 
63.6  53.9  53.9  -32.1  21.7  -143.5 
16.4  27.5  36.3  30.5  27.0  92.3 
First  the  more  easily  measurable  inflows  to SSA fell  since  the  early  199Os, 
from  around  US$5 billion  a year  to under  US$1.2 billion.  The composition  of these 
inflows  has evolved  somewhat  differently  from  other  regions. 
medium-  and  long-term  commercial  lending  to  both  the  public  or  private 
sectors  collapsed  after the debt crisis, similar  to that  in Latin  America;  but to 
an even more dramatic degree. In 1978-82, such  lending accounted for around 
half  of  total  inflows,  but  by  1990-93  outflows  virtually  offset  all  non-debt 
inflows. 
short-term  bank loans have always accounted for a larger proportion  of inflows 
than  in  other  regions  and  have  become  even  more  pronounced  in  1990-93; 
even  though  they  were only  around  20% of inflows  in  1978-82. 
foreign  direct investment  rose sharply as a proportion  of total inflows  over the 
period  1990-93, but has remained  relatively  small  (at around  US$l.6  billion 
a year  and lower  in real  terms  than  in the early  1980s) and confined  largely 
to  6 SSA countries; 
’ Of course,  factors noted for other developing  countries my  also be partly responsible, particularly: 
discrepancies  between source and recipient country data due to on-lending through intermediary countries; and 
inadequate data coverage  in source countries.  On the latter, see also Ffrench-Davis and Griffrrh-Jones, 1995. --  ---  - 7 
.  portfolio  investment  has grown  recently,  with  booms  in  most  regional  stock 
markets and the launching  of several new regional portfolio  funds, which (with 
the exception  of South AfXca) remains relatively  small, reaching  no more than 
US$ 120  million  a year  in  1990-93. 
Secondly  the  main  inflows  to  SSA have  been  difficult  to  record  or  classify  for  the 
following  reasons: 
.  with  the loosening  of borrowing  restrictions  on the private  sector,  short-term 
bank  loans to the private  sector for trade financing  have  grown considerably. 
At  the  same  time,  because  it has  not  historically  been  an  important  inflow, 
virtually  no  country  in  SSA has  adequate  recording  systems  for  monitoring 
private  sector  debt,  especially  shortiterm  debt.  Most  countries  do  not  even 
attempt  to  record  inflows,  believing  that  such  intrusion  may  prove  counter- 
productive  to the  spirit  and intent  of liberalisation; 
.  large  amounts  of  capital  inflows  by  residents  and  non-residents  are  mis- 
recorded  in the current  account  under  a residual  item,  “private  transfers”.8 
These  transfers  have risen  dramatically  since  SSA countries  liberalised  their  foreign 
exchange  systems,  by  firstly  introducing  “own-funds”  imports  where  no  questions 
were asked about the source of the funds; and later,  foreign  exchange  bureaux,  where 
all  current  account  transactions  may  be conducted.  Originally,  it was  assumed that 
the  source  of  funds  for  the  bureau  system  were  unrecorded  exports  and  workers’ 
remittances.  However,  more  recently  it  has  become  clear  that,  due  to  inadequate 
monitoring  and  supervision  of  bureaux  transactions,  virtually  any  capital  account 
transaction  can  also be conducted  through  the bureaux.’  In other  words,  the current 
account  is entirely  porous  and the capital  account has effectively  been liberalised.  In 
some  countries,  large  amounts  of  flight  capital  have  returned  (or  left)  through  the 
bureaux;  and  non-residents  are  thought  to  conduct  frequent,  albeit  small  capital 
account  transactions.  However,  due to  inadequate  recording  procedures,  it remains 
impossible  to  separate  out  the  proportion  of  bureaux  inflows  which  are  capital- 
related,  let  alone  to distinguish  among  types of capital-related  inflows.  In short,  the 
current  account-related  inflows  produces  “capital  inflows”  whose scale in relation  to 
the economy  exceeds  other  regions. 
Aggregate  net private  capital  inflows  to the six countries  in our sample  were greatly 
influenced  by  the  experience  of  South  Africa.  South Africa  was  a net exporter  of 
capital  in  the  period  1986-89.  However,  the  direction  was reversed  in  the  period 
1990-93.  The  huge  outflow  of  private  capital  from  South  Africa  resulted  in  the 
’ Similar recording of capital flows as current account transactions has been noted in El Salvador by S.Calvo 
and Reinhart 1995. 
’ It is also  likely  that there is substantial under-recording of the scale of the bureaux transactions. 8  --  - 
sample countries  recording  a net export of private capital  amounting  to US$6,195.6 
million  in  the period  1986-9.  This  was reversed  to  a net  inflow  of  private  capital 
amounting  to  US$  2,072.6  million.  Excluding  South  Africa,  the  five  remaining 
countries  received  private  capital  inflows  amounting  to US$85 1.4 million  in  1986-9 
increasing  slightly  to US$ 868.6  million  in  1990-93. 
The  experience  of  Zambia  also  presents  some  interesting  trends  in  private  capital 
inflows.  The net private  capital  inflows  amounted to US$714  million  in the period 
1986-89.  But this  significantly  declined  to  US$ 240  million  in  1991-93.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  remaining  countries  in  the  sample  experienced  sizable  growth  in 
inflows  during  1990-93 compared  to the period  1986-89 
. 
The  following  table  and  graph  shays  the  magnitudes  of  the  inflows  to  the 
region  in US$ millions. 
I  I  I 
Table  3: 
1 
1  1986-891  1990-931 1986-1993 
KENYA  647.7  779.6  1,427.3 
s.  AFRICA  -6,635.O  1,243.0  -5,412.O 
TANZANIA  765.2  943.9  1,709.l 
UGANDA  450.0  586.7  1,036.7 
ZAMBIA  597.0  200.0  797.0 
ZIMBABWE  -97.7  471.2  373.5 
TOTAJL  -4,292.a  4,224.4  -68.4 
Six  SSA  Countries  I 
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Capital Inflows to Six SSA  Countries  (in  USS  millions) 
(including  Private Transfers) 
Excluding  official  inflows,  it is estimated  that private  capital  inflows  to the 
six countries  as a ratio  to GDP increased  to an inflow  of 0.8  percent  in  1990-93 
from  a net outflow  of  1.2 percent  in  1986-89.  Zimbabwe  and  Uganda  recorded  an 
increase  in net private  capital  inflows  from  -0.4  and 3.2 percent  in  1986-89 to 2.0 
and 4.7  percent  in  1990-93 respectively.  Similarly,  Kenya  and Tanzania 
experienced  an increase  in net private  capital  inflows  from  1.7 percent  and 5.5 
percent  to 2.8  percent  and 9.1 percent  of GDP  in the two reference  periods 
respectively. 
On the contrary,  private  capital  inflows  as a ratio  to GDP  fell  markedly  in 
Zambia  from  6.0  percent  in  1986-89 to about  1.7 percent  in  1990-93.  One 
distinguishing  factor  between  Zambia  and the other  five countries  in our sample  is 
that macroeconomic  instability  was much  higher  in the  1990-93 period  compared 
to  1986-89.  In particular,  inflation  increased  from  an average  of about 50 percent 
in  1986/g to an average  of  149 percent  in  199013.  In the case of Kenya  and 
Zimbabwe,  the moderate  increase  in inflation  between the two periods  did not 
discourage  private  capital  inflows.  The  following  table shows  the capital  inflows 
to the region  as a percentage  of GDP. --i--  --  -  10  - 
Table  4 Private  Capital  as a ratio  of GDP 
Table  4:  Capital  inflows  % GDP  Capital  inflows  % GDP 
Including  Private  Transfers  Excluding  Private  Transfers 
1986-89  1990-93  1986-1993  1986-89 
0.862 
1990-93  1986-1993 
I 
KENYA  1.71% 
SOUTHAFRICA  -2.44% 
TANZANIA  5.501 
UGANDA  3.21% 
ZAMBIA  6.001 
z1rmABwE  -0.442 
TOTAL  -1.16% 
2.75%  2.15% 
0.29%  -0.775 
9.05%  7.022 
4.69%  3.91% 
1.69%  3.66% 
2.01%  0.82% 







0.89%  0.872 
0.282  -0.832 
-0.08%  -0.91%  ---l--  -0.16%  0.04#  2.032  4.38%  1.72%  0.87%  0.40%  -0.46% 
Graph  Private  Capital  as a ratio  of GDP 
Capital  Inflows  as  a Ratio  of GDP 
(Including  Private  Transfers) 
Overall,‘trends  in inflows  to SSA are similar  to those  for other  small 
countries,  relying  predominantly  on short-term  bank  loans  and FDI  rather  than 
MLT  loans  or portfolio  inflows  (S.Calvo  and Reinhart  1995). In terms  of their 
sustainability,  it is significant  that  the less volatile  MLT  bank  loans  and FDI 
virtually  cancel  each  other  out,  leaving  SSA economies  excessively  dependent  on 
short-term  bank  inflows,  which  could  be unsustainable. 
As indicated  above,  South  Africa  dwarfs the other  five  countries  as it 
accounts  for  about  58 per cent  of total  net private  capital  inflows  to the six 
countries  in the  sample  in the period  1990-93. Apart  from  the size of  inflows, 
nature  of  inflows  to South Africa  are quite different  from  those of the remaining 
countries  in the  sample.  The surprising  finding  is that even  for countries  that have 
had  stock  exchange  markets  for  long  e.g.  Zimbabwe  and Kenya,  investors  are yet 11 
to be significantly  attracted  to take share  holding  in domestic  investment.  This  is 
probably  due to the slow progress  in liberalising  the capital  account. 
The  other  interesting  finding  revealed  by the data is that investor 
confidence  has greatly  improved  in South  Africa.  In the period  1990-92,  South 
Africa  received  substantial  resources  under  the category  of short term  inflows  (net) 
amounting  to US$2,181  million  with  a peak  in  1991.  But since  1992 the shift  is 
in favour  of portfolio  investment  and private  long  term debt. 
Short  term  capital  inflows  have  exhibited  a very  high  level  of volatility.  In 
a number  of  instances  countries  have  recorded  high  inflows  in a year  followed  by 
an net outflow  in the subsequent  recording  period.  For  example  in  1987, Kenya 
received  net  inflows  under  this  account  amounting  to 2.6  per cent of GDP but this 
was followed  by  an outflow  equivalent  to -0.8  per cent of GDP.  The phenomenon 
was repeated  in  1990-91 when Kenya  allowed  holders  of foreign  exchange 
certificates  to negotiate  premiums  in secondary  market  trading.  As a result, 
Kenya  received  net  short  term  inflows  amounting  to about US$300 million 
(equivalent  to 3.2  per  cent  of GDP) in  1990 but following  the reversal  of the 
policy,  Kenya  experienced  an outflow  amounting  to US$273  million  (equivalent  to 
3.6  per cent  of  GDP)  in  1991.  Similarly,  Zambia  has recorded  wide swings  in net 
short  term  capital  inflows.  Net inflows  equivalent  to 4.2  per cent of GDP were 
recorded  in  1988 but were  followed  by outflows  in  1989 and  1990 equivalent  to 
2.4  and 3.3  per  cent  of GDP.  For  most of the countries  in the region,  short  term 
capital  inflows  are accounted  for by  short  term  trade credits. 
Foreign  direct  investment  has been mainly  directed  to Zambia  in the period 
1986-93 equivalent  to 3.62  per cent and 2.9  per cent of GDP  in  1986-9 and  1990- 
3 respectively.  This  could  be reflecting  investments  in the mining  industries. 
Kenya,  Tanzania  and Zimbabwe  have  also benefitted  from  FDI but the  inflows  as 
a percentage  of  GDP  are between  0.16  and 0.4  per cent.  For  the six countries 
aggregated,  FDI  amounted  to US$ 279.8  million  in  1986-89 increasing  to US$ 
475.2  million  in  1990-93.  This  represents  an increase  from  0.08  per cent of GDP 
to 0.09  per  cent  of GDP. 
The  other  development  which  distinguishes  South Africa  and Zambia  from 
the remaining  four  countries  is that the latter  countries  receive  substantial 
resources  recorded  as private  transfers.  Including  the inflows  in the broad 
assessment  of private  capital  inflows  reflected  that the six countries  exported just 
over  US$-4,292.8  million  in  1986-89 but received  over US$4,224.4  million  in 
1990-93.  In  the period  1990-93 private  transfers  accounted  for  over  50 per cent  of 
the total  private  capital  inflows  equivalent  to about 0.4  per cent of GDP.  Most  of 
the private  transfers  were  accounted  for by Kenya,  Uganda  and Tanzania.  The 
three  countries  recorded  receipts  of private  transfer  equivalent  to about 2.0,  4.9 
and 9.1  per  cent  of GDP.  Apart  from  the above  three,  Zimbabwe  also recorded  a 
marked  increased  in private  transfers  during  the  1990’s, especially  in  1992 when  it 
recorded  receipts  equivalent  to 0.6  per cent  of GDP. 12 
Finally,  it has not been possible  to collect  data on costs or maturity  of 
inflows  - particularly  of bonds;  or on the sources of  inflows  (especially  the 
division  between  domestic  and foreign  investors,  or the  sources  of  inflows).  These 
variables  would  be expected  to have major  implications  for  the 
sustainability/volatility  of  inflows  and the resulting  policy  response  (see 
7  1995 and Ffrench-Davis  and  Griff&Jones  1994). 
Composition  of Capital  Inflows  to SSA Countries. 
I ~~ 
Tabla  5 
NET  FLOW  OF  ST  DEBT 
NET  FLOW  OF  LT  DEBT 
PORTFOLIO  EQUITY 
PRIVATE  TRANSFERS 
’  COMPOSITION  AND  RI 
i  1986-89  I 
1990-93, 
I  USS  millib  IS  I  As a  I:  of  the 
LATIVE  SEARB  OF  CAPITAL  11 
SSA 
1986-93  1986-89  1990-93 
755.0  -0.1  0.1 
-1,682.0  0.7  0.3 
-3,737.0  0.5  -0.4 
541.0  0.3  0.4 
4,054.6  -0.4  0.5 
-68.4  1.0  1.0 
BLOWS  TO 
I 
1986-93  I 
CAUSES 
One of the central  issues in the debate  on the recent  private  capital  inflows 
is what  has caused  them?  The  factors  underlying  capital.inflows  to developing 









factors  include: 
political  and economic  (stabilisationIstructura1)  reforms  boosting  confidence 
in the economy; 
debt  restructuring  to reduce  the debt overhang  and enhance  the 
sustainability  of foreign  exchange  inflows; 
liberalisation  of foreign  exchange  markets  and the current  or capital 
accounts  of the balance  of payments; 
proliferation  of  specific  incentives  and simplification  of procedures  for 
direct  and portfolio  investment,  (Gooptu  1994); 
liberalisation  of restrictions  on private  sector foreign  borrowing. 
The  major  “push”  factors  have  been  identified  as: 
l  the decline  in  international  interest  rates; 
l  the cyclical  downturn  in developed  countries,  which  reduced  economic 
activity  and demand  for  investment  funds; 
l  the trend  towards  diversification  of assets by portfolio  investors,  limited  by 
a maximum  stock  of investments  in emerging  markets  which  such investors 
wish  to hold; 
l  changes  in regulations  in developed  countries  which  made  investment  in 
emerging  markets  easier  and more  profitable. 13 
Overall,  the  literature  has concluded  that both were  involved,  with  some 
stressing  “push”,  especially  interest  rate differentials  (Calvo  et al  1992 and  1994; 
Asea  and Reinhart  (1995) Chuhan  et al  1993; Femandez-Arias  1994) and others 
stressing  “pull”  (Edwards  1991; Hemandez  and Rudolph;  Niehans). 
One  of  the problems  with  much  of the literature  on causes of capital 
inflows,  is that  it tends to rely  on econometric  analysis  of relative  prices  (notably 
interest  rate  differentials),  which  takes too  little  account  of structural  factors  in 
individual  countries,  influencing  inflows,  or of the subjective  “sentiment”  factors 
influencing  international-capital  markets  (see Femandez-Arias  and Montiel  1995). 
As a result,  some  of the  literature  has attempted  to judge  the influence  of different 
“pull”  factors  by  trends  in the stock markets, of the recipient  countries,  or in their 
secondary  market  debt prices,  as if these trends were objective  measures  of the 
credibility  of  the  recipient  country.  This  is a particularly  dubious  method  to use 
for  SSA countries,  where  there  are large  subjective  “risk premia”  in all  such 
prices,  and where  individual  distorted  trades patterns  based on speculative 
information  can  determine  prices. 
There  has been  virtually  no econometric  analysis  of the causes of capital 
inflows  to SSA countries  with  the exception  of  Asea and Reinhart  1995, due 
partly  to lack  of data.  Given  the  less  “formal”  nature of the  inflows,  “push” 
factors,  especially  US short-term  interest  rates,  have had much  less of an impact 
than  in other  regions  (Asea and Reinhart),  indicating  that  inflows  might  be more 
sustainable. 
As a result  of the poor  sequencing  of adjustment  reforms,  it seems likely 
that  several  transitory  “pull”  factors  were even more  important  in SSA countries, 
notably: 
0  extremely  high  real  domestic  interest  rates on Treasury  bills,  and Central 
Bank  bills  were a major  factor  in capital  inflows  to Zambia  and Zimbabwe 
during  the  initial  stages of financial  sector liberalisation  (see also Asea  and 
Reinhart).  These  reflected  the inefficiency  of financial  intermediation  in 
SSA and  the ineffectiveness  of monetary  control  instruments  in the absence 
of  structural  reforms  of the financial  sector which  caused a self-sustaining 
cycle;  through  exchange  rate appreciation  and even higher  interest  rates 
attracting  capital  inflows  due to sterilisation  efforts  (see also  Galbis  1993; 
Montiel  1994; and Roe and Sowa  1995). In addition,  the high  domestic 
interest  rates pushed private  sector borrowers  to seek foreign  loans  in order 
to avoid  high  domestic  interest  rates. 
0  temporary  booms  in export  prices  which have (as in earlier  periods  - see 
Hadjimichael  et al) attracted  large  export prefinancing  loans  and speculative 
capital  inflows.  This  was particularly  the case in Kenya  and Uganda  in 
1994-95. 14  ~--  --  _ 
One other  factor  explored  has been  the  “spillover”  effects  from  the crisis  in 
Mexico  on  inflows  to all developing  countries,  and of inflows  to/from  large 
countries  on  smaller  countries  (S.Calvo  and Reinhart  1995). While  the spillover 
effects  from  Mexico  on SSA are not thought  to have been  great,  being  overruled 
by  regional  factors,  with  the exception  of South Africa.  A review  of South 
Africa’s  international  borrowing  reveals  that delayed  entry  of South Africa  into  the 
international  capital  markets  was to a great  extent  due to the Mexican  crisis.  There 
was a Global  bond  issue by South Africa  in December  1994 but this did not 
perform  well  as investors  shifted  to higher  quality  bonds  at the time.  Interest  in 
South  African  bonds  was only  regained  in the second half  of  1995.  This has been 
in part  influenced  by high  yield  on South African  bonds  and stable exchange  rate. 
Trends  in capital  inflows  to Kenya  and_Uganda have  also varied  sharply  with 
perceptions  of relative  economic  prospects  and arbitrage  opportunities  from 
relative  trends  in interest  rate and exchange  rates.  Similarly,  there  is growing 
evidence  that  capital  inflows  to South Africa  have  influenced  the entire  Southern 
African  region,  partly  because  South African  companies  are borrowing  for 
investment  in neighbouring  countries, 
A deeper  analysis  of the numbers  in the sample countries  in the study 
reveals  that  most  of the  short  term debt are trade credits.  Following  the 
liberalization  of the  foreign  exchange  markets  in these countries,  exporters  found  it 
cheaper  to access  short  term  finance  especially  from  buyers  of the exports  as 
foreign  interest  rates were  far lower  than  interest  rates prevailing  in these countries 
(refer  to table  7).  This  is explained  by  a combination  of pull  and push factors. 
From  the point  of view  of the creditors,  the export  creditors  have  an advantage  as 
it is common  for  foreign  governments  to guarantee  such lines  of credit.  This 
substantially  reduces  the risk borne  by the creditor  agency.  The  ECGD  of UK and 
COFACE  of  France  have  actively  participated  in the guaranteeing  credit  to SSA. 
Since  such  inflows  are normally  for  very  short periods  and are highly  volatile, 
there  is need  for  a rapid  restructuring  of the financial  sector  in these countries  to 
reduce  intermediation  margins.  There  is evidence  in the numbers  presented  in 
table  6 to suggest  that countries  in the sample  received  external  capital  on account 
of  the very  high  interest  rate differential.  In the case of Kenya,  this  is evidenced 
by  the  receipt  of short  term  debt which  increased  from  an outflow  of about US$70 
million  in  1988 to an inflow  of about  US$350 million  in  1989-90.  Similarly,  the 
inflow  of short  term  debt to Zimbabwe  increased  from  a net outflow  of US$8 
million  in  1986-88 to an outflow  of US$290 million  in  1989-90. 
The  temporary  high  interest  rates on treasury  bills  in Zambia  and Kenya  in 
the early  1990’s reflected  the inefficiency  of intermediation  in SSA financial 
systems  and  ineffectiveness  of monetary  control  instruments  in the absence of 
structural  reforms  of the financial  sectors.  It caused a self  sustaining  cycle 
attracting  capital  inflows  through  exchange  rate appreciation  and higher  interest 
rates  due to sterilization  efforts  (see Galbis  1993; Montiel  1994; and Roe and 
Sowa  1995). 15
:abla   6: Composition of Capital Inflow to I
I
PDI NET  FLOW OF
ST DEBT
1 1990-93 1966-89 1990-93
5 OF GDP
KENYA 0.362 0.302 0.23t 0.4ot 0.272 0.19t o.oot o.oot 0.a5t 1.86t 1.71t 2.75t
S.AFRICA -0.06t -0.01t -1.25t 0.29t -0.a7t -0.40t -0.40t 0.4ot 0.142 0.01t -2.44t 0.29t
TANZANIA 0.01t 0.302 -1.54t -0.37t o.oot 0.001 o.oot o.oot 7.04t 9.12t s-sot 9.05t
UGANDA 0.02t 0.062 0.202 -0.222 o.oot o.oot o.oot 0.002 2.99t 4.852 3.21t 4.69t
ZAMBIA 3.622 2.902 3.563 -0.86t o.oot o.oot o.oot 0.00) -1.182 -0.34t 6.00t 1.69t
ZIMBABWE -0.23t 0.16t 0.462 0.815 O.lBt 0.07t -0.43t -0.12t -0.412 o.zet   -.0.44t 2.01t
















NET  FLOW  OF PORTFOLIO EQUITY PRIVATE
LT DEBT TRANSFERS
1986-89 1990-93 1986-89 1990-93 1986-89 1990-93
102.0 53.0 0.0 0.0 320.7 527.6
-2376.0 -1760.0 -1004.0 1749.0 392.0 39.0
39.0 205.0 0.0 0.0 979.2 951.9
0.0 0.0 419.0 606.7
0.0 0.0 -117.0 -40.0
-95.4 -28.6 -91.1 66.6
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Table  7:  Lending  Rates 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Kenya  14  14  15  17  18  20  20  55  27 
S.  Africa  10  15  18  18  18  17  14  13  13 
Tanzania  12  19  28  30  31  31  31  39  39 
Uganda  40  30  40  50  45  41  33  20  22 
Zambia  27  21  18  18  35  na  55  113  70 
Zimbabwe  13  13  13  13  12  16  35  36  35 
All figures  are presented  as percent  per-annum 
For South Africa, the numbers  represeit the bank rate 
Further  analysis  of the  data on private  capital  inflows  reveals  that recent 
developments,  especially  in the policy  environment,  are key  in accounting  for  the 
inflows  to the  six countries  in our  sample.  In the case of South Africa,  political 
factors  influenced  the inflow  of capital  to the extent  of reversing  the outflows  that 
occurred  in the  1980s to inflows  in the  1990s. In particular,  the reforms  initiated 
by  De Klerk  in  1989 and the release  of Nelson  Mandela  in  1990 improved  the 
credit  rating  of  South Africa  resulting  in resurgence  of short  term trade  face. 
Further,  investor  risk  assessment  improved  following  successful  abolition  of the 
Financial  Rand  in March  1995rO.  The liberalisation  of the foreign  exchange 
markets  including  permitting  residents  to hold  foreign  exchange  in domestic 
banking  system  has also played  a catalytic  role  in the return  of flight  capital  and 
increasing  remittances  by nationals  working  abroad  in countries  in our sample 
excluding  South  Africa.  The countries  have mainly  attracted  private  transfers 
representing  mainly  return  of flight  capital,  workers  remittances  and mis-reported 
capital  account  transactions,  and short  term  inflows  mainly  on account  of financing 
trade.  The  presence  of sizable  private  transfers  in the overall  private  capital 
inflows  complicates  judgement  on volatility  of  inflows.  If  these are transformed 
into  holding  of  real  assets,  the private  transfers  will be less susceptible  to high 
volatility.  Chances  are that private  transfers  will  be sustained  as long  as attractive 
policies  are  maintained  such as allowing  residents/non  residents  to open  foreign 
exchange  denominated  accounts  in the domestic  banking  system. 
As countries  reduce  their  debt burden,  improve  on imports  cover  and 
maintain  a track  record  of private  sector  inflows  such as private  transfers,  their 
credit  rating  in  international  capital  markets  will  improve  and is likely  to trigger 
international  short-term  capital  inflows.  One interesting  observation  from  the 
numbers  is that  FDI  and private  short term  debt can be quite  sensitive  to the 
macro-economic  environment.  Zambia  was unable  to sustain private  capital 
10  Refer  m  he  Quarterly  R&w  Oaobcr  1995  Pg  2-10  of the CCIIUZ  for Rcsarch  into Ecommics  and  Finance  in South  Africa. inflows  at levels  experienced  in  1986-89 as the macroeconomic  environment 
worsened  during  1990-93. 
All  the  indications  are  that  it is pretty  difficult  to fully  assess whether  inflows 
to the region  are of temporary  nature.  This  makes  it difficult  to design  appropriate 
policy  response.  To the  extent  that the private  capital  inflows  are subject  to 
misjudgment,  countries  in the region  should  design  corrective  measures  well  aware 
that  the  inflows  are temporary.  Given  that  the financial  sectors  of countries  in the 
region  are  inefficient  and that  effectiveness  of monetary  policy  remains  weak,  the 
countries  are  faced  with  a big challenge  of absorbing  such inflows  without 
excessive  appreciation  in the domestic  currency. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
The  balance  of  international  opinion  on the sustainability  of private  capital 
inflows  has undergone  a virtual  U-turn  in the  last two years.  Though  some authors 
(Devlin,  Ffrench-Davis  and  Griffith-Jones  1994; UNCTAD  1994) have  been 
warning  of  problems  for  two years,  opinion  in the International  Financial 
Institutions  (IFI)  and the financial  community  was that  - because  capital  inflows 
reflected  a fundamental  revival  of confidence  in emerging  markets  and sustainable 
“push” factors  - they  were  sustainable,  though  their  magnitude  might  decline  over 
time.  Even  at the end of  1994, Washington  sources were  suggesting  that  a  “soft 
landing”  (i.e.  a gradual  decline  in net  inflows)  was possible,  unless  there  was a 
sharp  rise  in international  interest  rates  or collapse  in recipient  country  economies 
(Femandez-Arias  1994; World  Debt Tables  1994). 
In  1995,  opinion  moved  more  towards  the  “hard landing”  (large  fall  in net 
inflows)  and  “crash”  (large  net outflows)  scenarios  (see Femandez-Arias  and 
Montiel  1995 :  28),  with  organisations  such as the IMF  (ICM  1995) and BIS 
(Annual  ReDort 1995) suggesting  that,  with  the benefit  of hindsight,  the inflows 
were unsustainable. 
Opinions  in some African  countries  have undergone  a similar  evolution 
largely  responding  to actual  trends  in inflows.  Overall,  the causes of  inflows  to 
Africa  identified  above  would  appear  to  indicate  that  the stabilising  influence  of 
the  lower  weight  of  “push”  factors  might  be offset  by the higher  weight  of 
temporary/volatile  “pull”  factors  and regional  influences.  It might  be expected, 
therefore  that  inflows  would  be unsustainable. 
The  composition  of inflows  to SSA makes them  a priori  less sustainable.  It 
is generally  accepted  that  short-term  and portfolio  inflows  are highly  volatile 
(Griffith-Jones  1995; International  CaDital Markets;  Reisen  1993). It has been 
shown  that  FDI  exhibit  some  measure  of  volatility,  (Claessens  et al  1995). If we 
add private  transfers  - which  have been  the most volatile  type  of inflows  in SSA 
nations  to  the  volatility  ranking  of Turner  (1991).  Capital  inflows  to Africa  have 
been  highly  volatile. Nevertheless,  until  inflows  actually  declined  sharply,  opinion  in some 
quarters  was euphoric  about the prospects  for  continued  inflows,  on the  (untested) 
assumption  that permanent  “pull” factors  were  at work.  Without  a doubt,  as in the 
Mexican  case,  there  will  soon be many  sources  telling  African  governments  that 
the  inflows  were  “obviously”  unsustainable,  and identifying  previously-ignored 
economic  “fundamentals”  which  should  have  indicated  to anyone  with reasonable 
intelligence  that  the  inflows  could  not continue. 
The  key  issue for  African  governments  is to avoid  the euphoria  and the 
retrospective  judgements,  and to focus on objective  measures  of the sustainability 
of  inflows.  The  most convincing  suggestion  so far has been by  Dadush, 
Dhareshwar  and Johannes  (1994),  that net liabilities  ought  not to be more  than 
200%  of exports  or,  in dynamic  form,  that the change  in net liabilities  (measured 
as the ratio  of the current  account  deficit  to exports)  ought  not  to be more  than 
twice  the change  in exports  (averaged  over  a period  of 4 years).  This measure  has 
been  criticised  for  its assumption  of equal  weighing  for  a11  types  of inflows, 
ignoring  the higher  volatility  of short-term  and portfolio  inflows.  In addition,  it 
would  be inaccurate  for many  SSA countries,  because  it would  include  the current 
account  private  transfer  inflows.  A more  accurate  measurement  for  SSA countries 
would  be the change  in net liabilities  (measured  as the current  account  deficit 
excluding  private  transfers)  compared  to the change  in exports.  In addition,  to take 
account  of different  levels  of volatility,  it would  be desirable  to check  short- 
term/portfolio  inflows  as a proportion  of total  inflows  and in relation  to 
GDP/exports.  Sustainability  ought also to be judged  against  the fact that  domestic 
investors  can  nowadays  far more  easily  denominate  their  holdings  into  foreign 
exchange,  making  vulnerability  to outflows  much  greater. 
Finally,  SSA governments  should  be mindful  of the large  volume  of 
literature  indicating  that  inflows  to developing  countries  (and financial  inflows  in 
general)  are  intrinsically  volatile,  having  produced  6 crises in Latin  America  in the 
last  150 years  (see Griffith-Jones  1995). Perhaps  the most prudent  guideline  has 
been provided  by Williamson  (1994):  and that  is to regard  all positive  shocks  as 
temporary  and  all negative  shocks as permanent.  As Griffith-Jones  has pointed  out, 
if a country  bases policy  action  on assuming  that  inflows  are permanent,  they  are 
more  likely  to become  temporary  as in the case of Mexico,  while,  if it more 
prudently  assumes  they  are temporary,  they  are more  likely  to be permanent  as 
with  Chile. 19 
MACROECONOMIC  IMPACT  OF CAPITAL INFLOWS 
ON THE  DOMESTIC ECONOMIES 
The  economies  in the  Sub-Saharan  Africa  have over  the past decade  or so 
implemented  wide  ranging  policies  intended  to promote  efficiency  and growth  as 
mentioned  above.  It then becomes  difftcult  to assess whether  capital  inflows  are a 
cause  or effect  of macroeconomic  stabilization.  In particular,  ODA inflows  have 
played  a critical  role  in the reform  process  of a number  of countries  in the region. 
Because  of  such  inflows,  with  the associated  domestic  financing  of the budget, 
member  countries  have been  able to widen  both the current  account  and budget 
deficit  to GDP  ratios  without  threatening  macroeconomic  stability.  A related  issue 
is the n&-recording  of capital  account  transactions  in the current  account  as 
private  transfers.  To the extent  that private  transfers  are large,  the current  account 
deficit  to GDP  will  be underestimated. 
As indicated  earlier  all  countries  in the sample received  much  higher 
private  capital  inflows  in  1990-93 than  in the period  1986-89 with  the exception  of 
Zambia.  Private  capital  inflows  have  until  recently  often  been  seen as having 
largely  positive  effects;  namely  overcoming  foreign  exchange  and  import 
constraints;  supplementing  domestic  savings  and investment;  smoothing  national 
expenditure  by  compensating  for  negative  terms  of trade shocks;  raising  the 
microeconomic  efftciency  of production,  especially  by reducing  financial 
intermediation  spreads  and by  supplying  technology  and skills  through  FDI 
projects.  However,  more  recently,  developing  countries  have  come  to realise  that 
private  capital  inflows  can  also have  negative  effects,  especially  on macroeconomic 
stability,  linked  closely  to the above  positive  effects.  For  example: 
l  in attempting  to overcome  foreign  exchange  constraints,  capital  inflows 
could  lead to sharp  exchange  rate appreciation; 
l  if capital  inflows  are spent on  imports,  overcoming  the  import  constraint 
can  lead  to rising  current  account  deficits; 
0  if spent  on consumption,  capital  inflows  can discourage  domestic  savings 
and  have  no effect  on the amount  or productivity  of  investment; 
l  if developing  countries  financial  markets  are underdeveloped  and 
performing  poorly,  large  external  inflows  can reduce  their  intermediation 
efficiency  still  further,  causing  loss of monetary  control  and greater 
volatility  in financial  markets; 
l  overall,  if capital  inflows  are procyclical,  they exaggerate  all the 
destabilising  effects  of terms  of trade  changes. 
This  section  focuses  on each  of these effects  in turn. 
The  single  most  important  effect  of capital  inflows  has been  seen as on the 
exchange  rate,  because  they  have  led to sharp appreciation  in some  instances  and 
undermined  efforts  to improve  export  competitiveness  - and because  changes  in 
inflows  have  undermined  exchange  rate stability,  with negative  effects  on long- 20  - 
term  growth  (eg Ghura  and Grennes).  Their  effects  are hard  to disaggregate  from 
those  of other  stabilisation  measures,  terms  of trade changes  and official  capital 
inflows.  However,  Elbadawi  and Soto have  found  that all types of inflows  can 
have  large  short-term  destabilising  effects  on the exchange  rate,  even  though  short- 
term  and portfolio  inflows  have  no long-term  effect  on the exchange  ratei’;  and 
longer-term  direct  investment  inflows  have  effects  largely  consistent  with 
macroeconomic  equilibrium. 
The private  capital  inflows,  though  predominantly  short term,  have  led to 
short  term  exchange  rate appreciations  in almost  all countries  in our sample  as 
shown  in the  table  below.  Kenya  and Uganda  experienced  very  sharp appreciation 
in their  exchange  rate  in  1993/94 and  1994195 at time when private  transfers  and 
access  to short  term  trade credits  markedly  ‘increased.  The  appreciation  in real 
effective  terms  in both  Uganda  and Kenya  was well  over  20%  in  1994.  Zambia 
experienced  a depreciation  in real effective  terms  in  1991 which  was followed  by 
an appreciation  in  1992 and  1993 and a depreciation  in  1994.  Similarly,  South 
Africa  has experienced  movements  in either  direction  in its real effective  exchange 
rate.  In the period  1986 - 89,  when  South Africa  was a net exporter  of capital, 
the real  effective  exchange  rate depreciated  but appreciated  in the period  1990-92 
as the country  became  a net recipient  of capital.  Unlike  other  countries  in the 
sample,  Zimbabwe  has experienced  a depreciation  in the real effective  exchange 
rate  throughout  the period  1990-94. 
Table  8:  Nominal  and Real Exchange  IRates  1985 =  100 
Tanzania  Nl186.9 
R 
Uganda  N  209.0 
R 
Zambia  N  251.6 
R 
I 
Zimbabwe  N  106.2 
R I 
1987  1908  1989 
100.6  107.9  125.6 
92.8  103.0 
96.1  102.0 
367.4  567.4 





203.9  264.0  416.0 














1991  1992 
167.7  196.3 
108.1  100.7 
126.0  130.0 
95.0  91.3 
1252.6  1701.0 
382.0  438.0 
10955.0  16922.0 
217.0  227.0 
1990.0  5042.0 
81.0  75.0 
212.0  319.0 
126.0  128.0 
R - denotes real exchange rates 
N - denotes nominal exchange rates 
Source:  Economic and Social Statistics  on Africa ECA and; 
IFS  IMF Publication. 
1993  1994 
353.1  342.1 
128.0  100.0 
149.0  na 
93.4  92.6 
2316.0  2912.0 
497.0  497.0 
17835.0  14717.0 
23.0  179.0 
14026.0  24813.0 





11  Tbcsc  tcod  to  k  foxgnifti  by wcakaora  io  tbc  fwncial  seaor.  Ugxodx for  tic,  cxpcricrrcd  twbolrnce  in  tbe  foreign  exchange 
msrlrainAopuu1994purlydueu,prnichtheforriOnuchngc~asPuredbyrheinrbilityof~tdcrimu,holdwidcforriOn 
cxcbMgocxpoxomkvdx. 21 
A second  key  issue  is the balance  of  oavments  effect:  price-induced 
increase  in  expenditure  on  imports  (increasing  the current  account  deficit)  or 
reserves  accumulation.  This  is important  for  sustainability  because,  to  the degree 
that  capital  inflows  increase  the current  account  deficit  through  higher  imports, 
they  will  automatically  decline  as this macroeconomic  indicator  deteriorates 
(though  they  will  also  increase  fiscal  revenue  from  tariffs);  on the  other  hand, 
accumulation  of reserves  should  increase  inflows  by boosting  confidence.  Spending 
on  imports  has  also been  found  to lag well  behind  the receipt  of capital  inflows. 
Calvo  and  Reinhart  1995 suggest that  small  countries  in Latin  America  have  seen 
more  reserves  accumulation  and  less import  expenditure. 
The  experience  with  the  reserve  build  up in the countries  in our  sample  has 
been  mixed  making  it difficult  to identify  a,single  factor  accounting  for  observed 
changes  therein.  From  the  table  below  some countries  have  consistently  built 
reserves  over  the period.  However,  some of them lost reserves  due to a decrease 
in the medium  term  loans  especially  following  a scale down  in donor  financial 
support.  Zimbabwe  lost reserves  due the prolonged  drought  period  in  1992. The 
loss of reserves  in Kenya  and  South  Africa  was due to a decline  in official 
transfers,  while  in Zambia  and Tanzania  this  was accounted  for by the decline  in 
the medium  term  capital  inflows.  In  Uganda  and Zambia  the drop  in medium  and 
term  loans  was more  than  offset  by the  increase  in grants.  In addition,  some of 
these  countries  lost  reserves  because  of the  increase  in the  level  of imports.  One 
key  factor  which  has to be recognised  is that the private  transfers  have 
substantially  increased  in Kenya,  Uganda  and Tanzania  toa  point  that  donor 
disbursement  for  balance  of payment  support  is used for  reserve  build  up. 
Table  9:  External  Reserves  expressed  in months  of imports 
1986-89  1990  1991  1992  1993 
months of imports 
Kenya  1.6  0.9  0.6  0.4  2.2 
South Africa  7.2  5.6  6.7  8.1  5.8 
Tanzania  0.5  2.8  2.8  4.5  2.7 
Uganda  0.6  0.7  1.0  1.5  2.1 
Zambia  0.8  1.4  1.4 
3:: 
na 
Zimbabwe  1.5  1.3  1.3 
The  third  main  group  of effects  is on  investment/savings  and consumntion,  and 
thereby  on  GDP  growth.  In  this context,  it is important  to note  that  greater 
expenditure  on consumption  will  cause the  real exchange  rate to appreciate  more 
rapidly,  whereas  investment  will  slow appreciation  by importing  capital  goods  for 
investment  (Calvo  1994; Khan  and Reinhart).  This is particularly  true  of 
investment  expenditures  related  to FDI  transactions:  because  these are not 
intermediated  through  the domestic  financial  system,  they  will  have  less effect  on 
the  real  exchange  rate or  financial  markets.  Beyond the initial  division  into 
investment/consumption,  the key  variables  determining  the GDP-effect  are the type 
and productivity  of investment,  and the proportion  allocated  to the production  of 22 
tradables  . 
Unfortunately,  reliable  savings  and investment  data are extremely  rare  in Sub- 
Saharan  countries;  those  which  exist are usually  derived  as residuals  in national 
accounts.  Equally,  data on  import  composition  which  might  be used as a proxy  are 
usually  somewhat  out-of  date;  and data on the current  account  which  might 
indicate  a savings-investment  gap are also  misleading  because  they  include  some 
capital  account  inflows l2 Preliminary  calculations  based on  1986-93 data  . 
indicated  ambiguous  results  on savings  and investments  behaviour  in the  six 
countries. 
Zambia  managed  to  increase  the rate  of Gross Domestic  Investment  to GDP. 
This  was mainly  financed  by  ODA (refer  to’ Table  10).  Similarly,  Zimbabwe  was 
able  to marginally  increase  the ratio  of GDI to GDP.  For  the remaining  countries, 
GDI  to GDP  fell  between  the two periods. 








1986-89  1990-9j 
19.9  19.5 
2.7  2.2 
(1.4)  4.0 
3.8  0.2 
16  14.3 
23.2  11.1 
Macro-Economic  Indicators 
I 
7.0  28.0  1  39.0  36.0 
15.6  14.5 
31.0  22.0  47.0  105.3 
170.0  30.1  55.0  77.0 
50.0  149.0  33.0  69.0 
11.8  27.6  29.0  29.0 
The  savings  as a ratio  to GDP have  generally  decreased  in the countries  within 
our  sample  with  the exception  of Tanzania.  Zimbabwe  suffered  the biggest 
decline  of close  to  12 per  cent.  The trends  in Gross Domestic  Savings  to GDP 
indicates  that  growth  in these countries  is mainly  financed  by  foreign  savings.  To 
the extent  that  private  capital  inflows  are  volatile,  growth  is not sustainable. 
There  is an urgent  need to mobilize  domestic  savings to support  the growth 
process  especially  in Tanzania  and Uganda. 
The  numbers  presented  in Table  10 also reveal  that import  demand  as a ratio  to 
GDP  increased  in the countries  in the sample  with exception  of South Africa. 
Trade  liberalization  combined  with  increased  capital  inflows  to the six countries 
has  increased  import  dependence.  This  is especially  so in Kenya,  Zambia  and 
Zimbabwe. 
More  detailed  breakdowns  of types  and productivity  of  investment  and the 
12  In a  mlmbcr  of  c4nllmk  in  the  region,  bwcax tlam&doN  arc  nu  pmperly  raIegorisoi  calain  CapiIid  accowlI  uansaai0N  arc 
misrcpoMd  as  alfral!  xcoullt  trmsdom  uIl&  the  Iii  ‘prime  transfers’. -23 
proportion  allocated  to tradeable  are for  the time being  impossible,  as is any 
systematic  attempt  to isolate  the effects  of private  capital  inflows  from  those of 
other  variables  (notably  aid inflows).  Much more comprehensive  work  on the uses 
of  inflows  is needed  and may produce  dramatically  different  results.  This remains 
to be tested  and proven  through  surveys  of capital  transactions  for  a wider  range 
of countries  in the Cauital  inflows  project. 
Monetarv  and financial  effects  are the fourth  main  group.  A potential  risk of 
attempts  to prevent  exchange  rate  appreciation  through  accumulation  of reserves is 
the  loss  of monetary  control,  leading  to acceleration  in inflation.  The appropriate 
policy  response  to sterilise  the  liquidity  injection  through  open  market  operations. 
Depending  on the magnitude  of the liquidity  injection  and depth  of the facial 
sector,  there  is a great  likelihood  that  successful sterilisation  will  be attained  at 
very  high  interest  rates.  Further,  the appreciation  of the domestic  currency,  in 
both  nominal  and real  terms,  may  not be avoided. 
Increased  volatility  in financial  markets  has certainly  occurred  in SSA 
countries,  but less in the stock markets  than  in markets  for  Treasury  bills/central 
bank  bills  which  have been  attracting  private  capital  inflows,  causing  speculative 
bubbles  and  high  interest  rates,  with  knock-on  negative  consequences  for the 
performance  of bank  lending  portfolios  (Asea and Reinhart;  Calvo,  Sahay  and 
Vegh  1995;  Griffith-Jones  1995; International  Canital  Markets  1995). These can 
be magnified  by the imbalances  in the structure  of assets and  liabilities  produced 
by  capital  inflows.  The financial  system acquires  liquid  liabilities  in foreign 
exchange,  integrated  into  a volatile  international  capital  market  (to add to its 
volatile  domestic  liabilities  which  may be made more  volatile  by foreign  capital 
inflows),  while  its assets are neither  externally  protected  nor  liquid  (Rojas-Suarez 
and Weisbrod  1995). 
It  is difficult  to separate  the capital  inflow  effects  from  those  of the wider 
distortions  and underdevelopment  of the financial  sector:  capital  inflows  only 
exacerbate  the  moral  hazard  and adverse  risk selection  already  prevalent  by adding 
to the  volume  of funds requiring  intermediation  (Calvo,  Leiderman  and Reinhart 
1993).  However,  it is reasonable  to assume that the negative  effects  of capital 
inflows  on the  financial  system will  be more pronounced  in countries  where  the 
financial  sector  is in poor  health. 
Overall,  there  is strong  evidence  that private  capital  inflows  to some SSA 
countries  have  been procyclical  rather  than countercyclical,  following  terms of 
trade  booms  (Kenya/Uganda)  and exaggerating  all  of their  destabilising  effects: 
“Dutch  Disease” ” effects  (in contrast  to Latin America,  where  they  have offsetting 
terms  of trade  movements  - Ffrench-Davis  and Griffith-Jones  1994). 
The  effects  of such trends  may be even worse in SSA nations  than in other 
regions,  because  of their  high  degree  of aid dependence:  private  capital  inflows 
can  reduce  the  capacity  of SSA countries  to mobilise  aid inflows,  especially  for 24 
balance  of payment  support.  In the context  of liberalised  foreign  exchange 
markets,  private  inflows  have  reduced  private  sector  demand  for donor-funded 
import  support,  leading  donors  to cut new pledges  ( Zambia  and Zimbabwe). 
Similarly,  accumulation  of reserves  and the apparently  more  healthy  balance  of 
payments  position  leads donors  to question  the whole  rationale  of fast-disbursing 
balance  of payments  support  and lead them  to move  funds  to much  slower- 
disbursing  project  support.  This  may  not be appropriate,  given  the low absorptive 
capacity  of the project  implementing  agencies  and the continuing  budget 
constraints  which  would be better  resolved  by programme  aid.  The  negative 
implications  may  become  clear  if private  capital  inflows  reverse  themselves, 
leading  to  a fall  in international  reserves  precipitating  a foreign  exchange  crisis  as 
the currency  depreciates  rapidly.  The alternative  to programme  financing  is direct 
budget  support.  The  local  currency  equivalent  of a disbursement  is used to 
support  the budget  as the foreign  exchange  boosts  reserves.  Apart  from  name, 
direct  budget  support  has effects  similar  to those  of import  support.  Further,  it is 
equally  difficult  to sustain budget  support  if macro-economic  impact  of such 
inflows  adversely  affects  economic  growth. 
It  is for  these  reasons  that we prefer  to call  recent  events  in Uganda  a 
“Uganda  Disease”,  rather  than  a “Dutch Disease”  (see Kasekende  and Martin 
for  more  details  of this argument). 
POLICY MEASURES 
The potential  negative  economic  effects  of capital  infIows  discussed  in the 
previous  section  show the need  for policy  measures  to influence  their  scale and 
composition.  The  literature  has concluded  that  no  single  policy  measure  can 
influence  them  decisively.  Not surprisingly,  the effectiveness  of individual 
measures  depends  on the scale,  nature  and purpose  of the capital  inflows  and the 
characteristics  of the recipient  economy.  It is relatively  easy  to specify  theoretical 
policy  rules:  for  example,  short-term  volatile  portfolio  inflows  might  require  some 
offsetting  policy  intervention  to smooth  any destabilising  effects,  even  though  their 
long-term  effects  on equilibrium  might  be minimal;  while  long-term  direct 
investment  might  be entirely  consistent  with  long-term  macroeconomic  equilibrium 
and therefore  require  no corrective  measures  (Corbo  1994; Elbadawi  and Soto). 
However,  given  the problems  with data and monitoring,  many  SSA governments 
have  had  extreme  difficulty  in identifying  capital  inflows  (especially  their  scale, 






Three  types  of policy  measures  have been used by  countries  receiving  large 
inflows: 
measures  to increase  foreign  exchange  demand,  including  central  bank 
intervention  in foreign  exchange  markets;  liberalisation  of the current 
account;  and liberalisation  of the capital  account; 
measures  to reduce  aggregate  demand  and offset  the  inflationary  effects  of 25 
the  capital  inflows  or of intervening  in 
0  measures  to reduce  the scale of capital 
composition  in favour  of investment 
the foreign  exchange  market; 
inflows  or to influence  their 
The  crucial  question  for  African  countries  has been  whether  to resist 
exchange  rate  appreciation  and,  if so,  how.  The scope for exchange  rate policy 
change  has been  made much  more  limited  by the extreme  degree  of liberalisation 
(to a free  float)  implemented  in most  non-CFA  countries,  compared  to the  “basket 
pegs”,  administered  devaluations  or band  mechanisms  used  in other  developing 
countries  (mentioned  earlier  in this paper).  This makes  many  of the conventional 
recommendations  irrelevant:  such as those  for moves  towards  more  exchange  rate 
flexibility,  administered  appreciations  or depreciations,  or deliberate  introduction 
of exchange  rate uncertainty/noise  to deter  speculators.  Some Washington-based 
authors  have  even  suggested that exchange  rate policy  is no longer  relevant  or 
feasible  in SSA circumstances.  However,  given  the central  role  of exchange  rate 
depreciation  in the few successful  adjustment  programmes  in SSA - notably  in 
promoting  export  competitiveness  - most  African  governments  have  preferred  to 
treat  any  exchange  rate appreciation  as a major  problem  and to take measures  to 
reverse  or reduce  it.r3 
Furthermore,  policy  response  to the large capital  inflows  has been 
complicated  by  the current  fiscal  stance.  With  the exceptions  of South  Africa,  the 
countries  have  faced varying  degree  of budgetary  problems.  The budget  deficits 
expressed  as a percentage  of GDP have  varied  from  between  1.0 and  13.0 percent. 
In case of Kenya  and Zimbabwe,  these have  remained  high  throughout  the first 
half  1990s.  Uganda  and Zambia  have  since  1992 achieved  significant  success in 
controlling  the budget.  In the case of Uganda  the Government  has made  substantial 
repayments  to the banking  system  since  1992. This has been  achieved  through 
strict  control  of  Government  expenditure  combined  with  efforts  to boost  revenue 
mobilisation.  The countries  in the sample mostly  rely  on the sale of  financial 
instruments  (mainly  treasury  bills)  to sterilise  liquidity  injections.  In cases where 
fiscal  policy  is expansionary,  open market  operations  are used to promote  macro- 
economic  stability,  Similarly,  liquidity  injection  arising  from  mopping  up of excess 
foreign  exchange  from  the market  would  be sterilised  mainly  by  sale of financial 
instruments.  As pointed  out earlier,  the instrument  suffers  from  limitation  arising 
from  the  lack  of depth  in the financial  sector. 
MEASURES  TO INCREASE  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE  DEMAND 
Unsterilised  intervention  in the foreign  exchange  market,  leading  to 
reserves  accumulation,  will  increase  the money  supply.  This can have  secondary 
positive  effects  by  reducing  interest  rates and making  inflows  less likely  - but  (in 
the absence  of  an accommodating  increase  in money  demand)  it may  also  increase 
inflation  and thereby  increase  the real  appreciation  of the exchange  rate  further. 
I3  For a powerful argument of the case for making the exchange rate a key element of development policy,  see 
Williamson  1995. 26 
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Nevertheless,  in the absence  of monetary  tools  which  can sterilise  such large 
inflows,  this  has often  been  the first  line  of defence  for  low-income  SSA countries. 
Current  Account  Liberalisation.  One recommendation  in the literature  is for 
greater  current  account  liberalisation  in order  to increase  demand  for  foreign 
exchange.  As already  discussed,  current  account  transactions  have been  fully 
liberal&d  in the Anglophone  SSA countries  which  have  been experiencing  capital 
inflows.  The  only  additional  liberalisation  which  could  occur  is reduction  of 
import  tariffs.  It is unlikely  that this  would have much  effect  on increasing  import 
demand,  given  the existing  high  level  of import  dependence  of low-income  SSA 
countries  and the low level  of enforcement  of tariff  collection.  In addition,  a 
reduction  in tariffs  would  be undesirable  given  the dependence  of the budget  on 
tariff  revenue;  and an increase  in import  demand  would be undesirable,  given  the 
already  high  import  dependence  of  SSA countries  and the failure  of adjustment 
programmes  to effect  any  rationalisation  of import  demand. I4 Thus further 
current  account  liberalisation  would  not be a priority  tool  for most SSA countries. 
Canital  Account  Liberalisation.  This  is seen as a second method  of 
increasing  demand  for foreign  exchange.  Suggestions  include  full capital  account 
liberalisation  to allow  capital  outflows  which  would  offset  inflows;  to reducing/ 
eliminating  subsidies  on any  inflows  (eg incentives  for  foreign  investment,  deposit 
insurance  or  subsidised  forward  cover  on foreign  exchange  transactions);  targeting 
gradual  liberalisation  designed  to encourage  certain  types of  inflows/outflows  (see 
Fischer  and Reisen  1992). 
In  some  SSA countries,  such measures  might  well be ineffective  at this 
time,  given  the relative  unimportance  of inflows  subject to capital  account  controls 
or  subsidies/incentives,  and the predominance  of  inflows  coming  through  the 
porous  current  account  and the bureaux.  However,  Kenya  in October  1994 
announced  far  reaching  measures  intended  to offset  capital  inflows.  Residents  were 
permitted  to  invest  abroad  and to hold  overseas  account.  South Africa  and 
Zimbabwe  are currently  having  active  debates about capital  account  liberalisation. 
The  recent  trend  call  for critical  analysis  (see Ffrench-Davis  and Griffith-Jones 
1994) due to risks  that: 
l  liberalisation  may  well  increase  inflows  (Hanson  1992; Laban and Larrain 
1993; Mathieson  and Rojas-Suarez  1993; Williamson  1992); 
l  it may  also undetmine  the effectiveness  of sterilised  intervention  by making 
domestic  and foreign  bonds  fully  substitutable; 
l  correct  sequencing  of capital  account  liberalisation  with other  measures 
(especially  stabilisation  and internal  financial  sector  strengthening  and 
liberalisation)  is crucial.  Almost  the only  consistent  sequencing 
recommendation  of adjustment  literature  is that capital  account 
liberalisation  should  be one of the last steps in adjustment  policy  (see 
‘* For more on these issues,  see Martin and Misery 1995. 27 
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Kasekende  and Martin  1995):  thus  it should  not be undertaken  prematurely 
in countries  with  weak domestic  financial  systems,  merely  in order  to 
influence  private  capital  inflows. 
MEASURES  TO REDUCE  AGGREGATE  DEMAND 
As in other  regions,  sterilisation  through  onen market  onerations  has been 
the  most  popular  policy  in SSA countries.  Sterilisation  has 2 main  risks,  which  has 
provoked  debate  over  whether  it is  “easy”  (Reisen)  or  “hard” Calvo  et al 
1993/1994): 
0  that  it will  perpetuate  interest  rate  differentials  and accelerate  capital 
inflows.  Frankel  concludes  that  sterilisation  will  increase  interest  rates,  but 
to a much  larger  degree  if the  source  of the problem  is higher  export 
receipts  or higher  money  demand  rather  than capital  inflows.  The degree  of 
increase  will  depend  on the  substitutability  of government  paper  and other 
assets,  on the behaviour  of the demand  for money  (especially  its sensitivity 
to interest  rates),  and on the  interest  elasticity  of aggregate  demand. 
However,  Femandez-Arias  and Montiel  indicate  that the higher  interest  rate 
effect  should  be only  temporary. 
l  that  it will  increase  fiscal/quasi-fiscal  burdens  of government  or central 
bank  paper,  both  through  larger  issues of such paper,  and through  higher 
interest  rates than  the central  bank  can obtain  on its reserves  (Calvo  et al 
1994; Corbo  1994). 
For  these reasons,  some have  suggested  that a more  realistic  target than 
complete  sterilisation  is to maintain  the pre-inflow  growth  rate of real balances,  as 
has been  achieved  by Chile. 
As a result  of the  over-reliance  on the treasury  bill  instrument  to sterilise 
both  large  capital  inflows  and finance  wide  budget deficits,  interest  rate have 
increased  sharply  in some  countries.  Tanzania,  Kenya and Zambia  have  suffered 
from  this  problem  at different  times  during  the early  1990s with discount  rates 
increasing  to well  over  50 percent  per  annum.  To avoid  the problem,  fiscal  policy 
should  be tight  to ease the burden  of  mopping  up.  Uganda offers  a good example 
of  the latter.  The  discount  rate on treasury  bills  in Uganda have  fallen  from  40 
percent  in  1990 to the current  levels  of between  9 and  15 percent.  The recent 
experience  of Zambia  also  supports  the need  for  fiscal restraint.  Zambia  has 
managed  to reduce  the discount  rate  of the  treasury  bills  from  over  70 percent  in 
1993 to about  20 percent  in  1994 through  fiscal  discipline. 
Other  Methods  of  Sterilisation  can be used,  including: 
l  increasing  the reserve  ratio  on bank  deposits  (or particular  types of 
deposits).  Though  this  represents  a tax on the banking  system  (because 
reserve  requirements  are not  remunerated),  it can be a highly  effective 28 
prudential  measure  in reducing  intermediation  spreads and the money 
multiplier  and credit  to the private  sector  (Reinhart  and Reinhart).  It  can 
work  particularly  effectively  on individual  types of  inflow  (eg offshore 
borrowing  or uncovered  foreign  exchange  exposure)  and if used counter- 
cyclically  to target  the  source  of a boom.  However,  over  the medium  term, 
it risks  decreasing  the efficiency  of the financial  system by pushing 
borrowers  towards  less efficient  lenders  in order  to avoid  the effects  of 
reserve  requirements.  In  addition,  it requires  a balanced judgement  about 
the possible  negative  effects  on key  elements  of finance  such as trade 
finance  - which  was excluded  from  the Chilean  reserve  requirements 
increases. 
Kenya  and Tanzania  have  both  used the policy  of varying  reserves 
requirements  in management  of  liquidity  requirements.  However,  given  the 
current  weakness  in the  financial  sector,  the policy  tends to further  widen 
the  intermediation  costs.  For  that reason,  Uganda  has avoided  increasing 
the  reserves  requirements.  Efforts  have been made to reduce costs to 
commercial  banks  by treating  a portion  of vaults  cash as reserves  eligible  in 
addition  to reducing  the reserves  requirement  to the current  level  of  8.0 
percent.  The difference  in policy  of reserves  requirement  may  offer  a 
partial  explanation  for  the  far  higher  lending  rates  in Kenya  and Tanzania 
compared  to Uganda. 
0  moving  government  deposits  (or postal  savings/social  security/public 
enterprise  funds)  from  commercial  banks to the central  bank or into 
government  paper  (see Fischer  and Reisen  1992; Reisen  1993; Khan  and 
Reinhart  1995).  This  has also proved  to be a highly  effective  means  of 
sterilisation.  However,  depending  on the interest  rates paid by the central 
bank,  this  could  have  the effect  of reducing  the rates paid to savers  or of 
increasing  interest  rate costs  to the central  bank. 
Fiscal  Measures.  Many  Washington-based  authors  see this as the only  long- 
term  policy  tool  (Corbo  1994; Schadler  et al  1993). Similarly,  the main 
recommendation  in SSA adjustment  programmes  has been to tighten  fiscal  policy, 
for  three  reasons: 
0  to guard  against  the  inflationary  impact of possible  eventual  reversal  of 
capital  inflows. 
0  to offset  the effects  of sterilisation  by reducing  interest  rates due to lower 
government  borrowing,  thereby  discouraging  capital  inflows; 
0  It has also been  suggested  that expenditure  cuts are more  effective  than  tax 
rises  in reducing  aggregate  demand  (Calvo,  Leiderman  and Reinhart  1993). 
However,  many  authors  have  cautioned  against  the distortion  of  long-term 
fiscal  plans  in order  to offset  potentially  temporary  capital  inflows.  This  could  be 
especially  important  in those  SSA countries  where expenditure  is already  at _  29  -  .-  - 
critically  low  levels  and the potential  to increase  revenue  is limited. 
They  have  also  indicated  that  fiscal  measures  may  increase  capital  inflows 
by  reducing  prospects  of government  liquidity  problems  and freeing  funds  for 
domestic  borrowing  linked  to some types  of capital  inflows. 
Nonetheless,  the policy  of fiscal  restraint  has been used with measurable 
success  in Uganda.  The  recent  positive  experience  in Zambia  and the difficulties  in 
promoting  macro-economic  stability  in Kenya,  Tanzania  and Zimbabwe  lend 
further  support  to fIsca1 restraint.  Uganda  has managed  to  absorb  the large 
inflows  without  losing  control  over  inflation  and interest  rates. 
Measures  to Increase  Domestic  Savings/Reduce  Consumntion.  These are 
sometimes  seen as measures  to reduce  aggregate  demand,  and sometimes  as 
measures  to  influence  the expenditure  of capital  inflows.  Similarly,  targeted 
sterilisation  measures  (reserve  requirements  on particular  types of capital  inflows 
or borrowing)  may  be used to reduce  aggregate  demand  and to influence  the 
composition  of  inflows. 
Most  SSA adjustment  programmes  have recently  begun  to include  dramatic 
measures  to boost  private  savings  by  reform  of the financial  sector.  However,  the 
principal  mechanisms  proposed  have  been greater  competition  in the financial 
sector  by  more  open  entry  of new financial  institutions,  and liberalisation  of 
interest  rates.  There  is little  evidence  from  Africa  or elsewhere  that  such measures 
have  had  a dramatic  positive  effect  on private  savings,  and there  is a high  risk  that 
other  measures  in financial  sector  reform  programmes  may undermine  prospects 
for  higher  private  ftnancial  savings  rates  (especially  the disappearance  of rural 
bank  branches  and savings  networks).  Finally,  some of the key  factors  in 
mobilising  private  sector  savings  in other  countries,  such as postal  savings banks, 
more  productive  social  security  funds,  or private  pensions,  have barely  been 
considered.15 Given  this design  of financial  sector reform,  it seems unlikely  that 
measures  to  increase  domestic  financial  savings will  have effects  large  enough  to 
counteract  the  effects  of private  capital  inflows. 
MEASURES  TO  INFLUENCE  THE  SCALE  / COMPOSITION  OF 
INFLOWS 
Canital  Controls  and Taxes.  There  has been heated  debate over  the desirability 
and  feasibility  of capital  controls  and taxes,  with some (Dornbusch,  Griffith-Jones, 
Williamson)  believing  they  are an essential  part of the policy  arsenal;  and others 
(Corbo  1994,  Schadler  et al  1993; Mathieson  1993) seeing them as a temporary 
and  largely  ineffectual  measure,  which  are quickly  dodged  through  over-  and 
under-invoicing  of trade  or  through  parallel  financial  and foreign  exchange 
markets.  However,  recently  even  conservative  sources (BIS 1995  ;  IMF 
Is For more on a typical financial sector reform programme in Africa, see Martin 1995. International  Canital  Markets  1995) have  acknowledged  the positive  role  played  in 
the  Latin  American  and Asian  cases by  such measures  as: 
extra  reserve  requirements  on particular  inflows,  especially  on foreign 
borrowing  by companies  or banks  or open foreign  exchange  positions  of 
the banks 
quantitative  restrictions  on inflows,  for example  on foreigners  buying  Treasury 
bills  (in Malaysia)  or domestic  bonds  (Colombia) 
taxes  on  short-term  inflows  aiming  to reduce the dollar  returns  of  investments 
(in Brazil,  Chile  and Colombia). 
minimum  stay periods  on FDI  (Colombia) 
Some  have  tried  to distinguish  among  measures  which  are good  for short 
periods  (taxes and bans)  and those  which  are desirable  for  longer  periods 
(prudential  regulations  such as reserve  requirements),  but the consensus  appears  to 
be growing  that  many  forms  of controls  on capital  inflows  are an essential  weapon 
in the policy  makers’  arsenal,  provided  that they  are accompanied  by measures  on 
foreign  exchange  demand  and domestic  demand  above,  and pursuit  of  “sound 
macroeconomic  fundamentals -. 
Given  the  current  absence  of data  on capital  inflows  in many  SSA countries,  it 
is hard  to see how  governments  could  design  appropriate  capital  inflows  controls 
or taxes.  Any  measures  designed  in the current  low-information  context  would  be 
more  likely  to risk  exacerbating  current  distortions  or speculative  bubbles.  In 
addition,  the  arguments  used about  evasion  in middle-income  countries  with better 
recording  systems  would  apply  more  strongly  in SSA countries,  making  effective 
implementation  doubtful.  The  same would  apply  to any SSA participation  in a 
global  tax.  However,  once  more  information  is available,  it should be possible  to 
design  carefully  targeted  controls  and taxes. 
CONCLUSION 
Where  does  the above  analysis  leave  African  policy  makers  in deciding  which 
policy  measures  to use to react  to capital  inflows  ? As in every  other  country,  the 
need  for  policy  intervention  depends  on the size and composition  of inflows,  their 
causes,  and the perception  and objective  analysis  of their  sustainability.  We have 
shown  that  the  key  fust  step for  all  Sub-Saharan  countries  must be to improve 
recording  and monitoring  of inflows.  For  some,  this means starting  virtually  from 
scratch  with  Disaggregating  inflows  through  the bureaux and monitoring  private 
sector  borrowing;  for  others,  it is a more  sophisticated  process  of improving  the 
coverage  of existing  monitoring,  especially  of uses of inflows.  However,  for  those 
countries  which  have  abandoned  all monitoring,  there  is concern  that any  attempt 
to record  inflows  would  be perceived  by the markets  as an attempt  to control,  and 
would  undermine  the credibility  of  liberalisation,  driving  the capital  inflows  away 
or back  into  the parallel  markets. - _-. _ 
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In  order  to facilitate  proper  analysis  of capital  inflows  and their 
macroeconomic  effects  and  in attempting  to influence  these  through  appropriate 
policy  measures,  authorities  must  seek to improve  the recording  and the 
monitoring  systems  both  in their  own countries  and in  international  organisations. 
The  intractable  problem  though  is firstly,  how to introduce  recording  and 
monitoring  systems  without  driving  capital  inflows  back  to the parallel  market;  ’ 
and  secondly  how  best to monitor  and  improve  international  data  sources. 
Nevertheless,  pending  improvements  in the data,  it is possible  to see that: 
l  contrary  to the message  of global  databases,  several  Sub-Saharan  countries 
have  experienced  sizable  private  capital  inflows  which  are larger  compared 
to their  economies  than  those  of  Latin  American  and Asian  countries; 
l  the  composition  of those  inflows  (insofar  as it is known),  indicates  that  large 
elements  (private  transfers  and short-term  bank  inflows)  could  be volatile. 
However,  the prospects  of maintaining  private  transfers  given  an attractive 
macro-economic  environment  are high. 
l  the causes  of the  inflows  have  been  predominantly  “push”  factors  and 
transitory  “pull”  factors,  and regional  spillover  effects  in Southern  African 
countries,  rather  than  permanent  “pull”  factors,  again  indicating  their  likely 
unsustainability  ; 
l  perceptions  and objective  analyses  of sustainability  both  indicate  that the 
inflows  could  be temporary  but  as indicated,  lack  of  information  on the 
nature  of  investment  may  render  them permanent. 
The potential  volatility  of the inflows  makes a strong  case for  action  to monitor 
them  and to minimise  their  destabilising  macroeconomic  effects. 
The  type  of action  to be taken  depends  on the macroeconomic  effects  of the 
inflows,  compared  to the current  situation  and objectives  of the government.  As 
for  the effects: 
l  flows  to  Sub-Saharan  countries  have  consistently  caused  real  exchange  rate 
appreciation,  either  through  nominal  appreciation  (where  stabilisation 
policies  have  been  tightly  pursued)  or through  inflation  where  they  have 
not. 
l  they  have  sustained  high  import  levels  and permitted  reserves  build-up  in the 
countries  analysed; 
l  they  have  caused  protracted  financial  instability  and undermined  financial 
sector  reform  programmes; 
l  they  have  been  procyclical  and complicated  aid mobilisation  efforts. 
The  current  situations  and objectives  of the governments  are remarkably 
similar.  All  of the countries  studied  share objectives  of competitiveness  and 
reducing  inflation:  yet,  with  the possible  exception  of  South  Africa,  none  of them 
would  wish  to use a stable  exchange  rate  as an inflation  anchor.  All  have  relatively 
recently  embarked  on financial  sector  reform  programmes,  and are anxious  to 
raise  domestic  savings  from  current  low levels (again  South  Africa  is the exception 
with  much  higher  savings  levels). -  .-..-  - -.  32 
Given  the  need  to balance  the objectives  of competitiveness  and stability,  the 
desirable  policy  mix  for  SSA countries  would be a pragmatic  one drawing  on the 
maximum  number  of policy  levers,  as in Chile,  rather  than  relying  exclusively  on 
sterilised  intervention  or  fiscal  compression  (Femandez-Arias  and Montiel  1995; 
Williamson  1995).  However,  as with  small nations  in other  continents,  fewer 
policy  options  are currently  open to SSA governments  (S.Calvo  and Reinhart 
1995),  because  of the following  factors: 
l  their  complete  exchange  rate flexibility,  and highly  open  current  account 
openness  and  (through  a porous  current  account)  capital  account; 
l  their  slow progress  with  structural  reforms,  notably  development  of the 
domestic  financial  sector,  which  make sterilisation  methods  less effective 
and  formal  capital  account  opening  less desirable,  for  fear  of exacerbating 
the poor  health  of most domestic  banks; 
l  (in  some  countries)  the poor  fiscal  position,  which  makes  sterilisation  costs 
unsustainable;  (in others)  the prior  fiscal adjustment,  which  makes  further 
fiscal  adjustment  to temporary  capital  inflows  undesirable  and politically 
problematic; 
l  the poor  quality  of data  and of enforcement  mechanisms  for  taxes and controls 
of any  kind,  and the unconventional  nature  of much  of the capital  (in the 
form  of private  transfers)  which  will make capital  taxes and controls 
(whether  national  or global)  less effective. 
Given  these  factors,  the priority  policy  measures would  appear  to be: 
l  sterilised  intervention  in order  to minimise  inflation  and to accumulate  reserves 
to guard  against  reversal  of capital  inflows; 
l  application  of selective  reserve  requirements,  especially  on offshore  borrowing 
and  foreign  borrowing  by the private  sector; 
l  fiscal  tightening,  despite  shortcoming,  is consistent  with promoting  macro- 
economic  stability  in countries  faced with high  capital  inflows  given 
relative  ineffectiveness  of monetary  policy; 
l  transfer  of government/other  deposits  from commercial  to central  banks  should 
be considered  but may undermine  stability  in the financial  sector given 
current  weaknesses  in the sector; 
l  measures  to limit  foreign  purchases  of Treasury  bills  and domestic  bonds; 
l  removal  of  incentives  for capital  inflows  and selective  gradual  opening  of the 
capital  account  (where justified  based on analysis  of motives  for 
inflows/outflows  and on adjustment  sequencing  considerations). 
l  convincing  donors  to maintain  levels  of balance  of payments  and/or  fiscal 
support  in order  to increase  reserves and guard against  future  outflows. 
Even  this  seemingly  specific  and limited  list looks  long  for  a typical  Sub- 
Saharan  policy-maker  faced with many  other demands on their  scarce human resources  for  monitoring,  research  and policy  design/implementation.  Yet,  as 
strikingly  put by  Sara Calvo  and Carmen  Reinhart  (1995,  p.35), 
“While  sound  macroeconomic  policies  are advisable,  policy-makers  in 
smalI  countries  are  advised  to be extra  cautious  in protecting  the 
domestic  financial  system against  the vagaries  of international 
capital  inflows”. 
Most  Sub-Saharan  countries  are very  small:  thus the problem  of  large 
unsustainable  capital  inflows  is one they  should  take very  seriously,  devoting 
resources  to urgent  further  analysis  of its scale and causes,  and  the policy 
measures  they  can take to minim&  its negative  effects. AnDendix one 
ABRIEFS  UMMARY  OF  LIBERALIZATION  PROCESS  IN  SELECTED 
COUNTRIES  IN  SOUTHERN  AFRICA. 
Zimbabwe  The  experience  of Zimbabwe  in liberalizing  its economy  is fully 
described  in Ncube  et al (1995).  The  first  phase  of the liberalization  process  was 
started  in  1990 with  the objective  of moving  the economy  from  a highly  regulated 
status to a market  oriented  one.  Imports  were substantially  liberalized,  while 
surrender  requirements  remained  in force.  The current  account  deficit  deteriorated 
from  US$147  million  in  1990 to US$ 500 million  in  1991.  In the following  year, 
Zimbabwe  devalued  its currency  to eliminate  overvaluation.  Unfortunately,  the 
economy  was hit  by  a drought  in  1992 which  further  widened  the current  account 
deficit.  The  deficit  was financed  by external  borrowing,  enabling  government  to 
maintain  a high  level  of reserves.  The  cover  of imports  increased  from  4.1 
months  in  1993 to 5.5  months  by end  December  1994 and 7 months  by June  1995. 
The  controls  in  foreign  exchange  dealing  were gradually  eased in the period  1992- 
94,  and the  Government  allowed  foreign  investors  to freely  invest  in the 
Zimbabwe  Stock  exchange  and remit  both  capital  and dividends,  beg-g  July 
1993.  Foreign  exchange  surrender  requirements  were also  gradually  eased. 
Between  January-July  1994, exporters  were required  to surrender  40 per  cent 
of their  earnings  at the official  rate while  60 per cent could  either  be sold  in the 
interbank  market  or held  on a foreign  currency  account  (FCA).  The  surrender 
requirement  was abolished  1st July  1994. The exchange  rate  was gradually 
depreciated  from  Zim.  $2.8  in  1990 to  Zim.  $8.2  per US$ in  1994.  An  interbank 
foreign  exchange  market  (IFEM)  was set up January  1994, though  the Reserve 
Bank  of Zimbabwe  (R.B.Z)  remained  an active  participant  in the market 
especially  during  the fust  six months  of  its operation.  The RBZ initially  retained 
an official  window  rate but the two tier  exchange  rate was finally  abolished  1st 
July  1994.  In  order  to increase  competition  in the  interbank,  Government 
permitted  the  setting  up of foreign  exchange  bureaux.  Zimbabwe  became  an 
Article  VIII  member  of the  IMF  in February  1995. 
A key  outcome  of financial  reform  in Zimbabwe  is the surge in domestic 
interest  rates,  both  nominal  and real,  from  about  10 per cent  in  1990 to 30 per 
cent  by  1994.  As a result  some private  sector borrowers  resorted  to cheaper  credit 
lines  from  external  sources  precipitating  a  real  appreciation  of the Zimbabwean 
dollar. 
Zambia.  Zambia  gradually  moved  its foreign  exchange  regime  from  a 
controlled  to a market  based system  over  the period  1992 to  1995.  As a first 
step,  Zambia  established  a foreign  exchange  bureaux  system  in October  1992, 
which  operated  simultaneously  with  the  official  window  managed  by Bank  of 
Zambia.  The  dual  system  was eliminated  in December  1993, with  the setting  up of the  interbank  system.  Since then,  the foreign  exchange  system  has been  fully 
market-based. 
In January  1994, all  forms  of exchange  controls  on both capital  and current 
account  transactions  were eliminated.  The  nominal  exchange  rate depreciated  by 
over  80 per  cent  from  Kwacha  177 per US$ in  1992 to about K942 in September 
1995.  However,  with  the very  high  rate of inflation  experienced  during  the period 
the  real  exchange  rate actually  appreciated.  Zambia’s  import  cover  rose from  1 
month  in  1991 to 2.5  months  by  1994. 
Interest  rates  were liberalized  in September  1992 at a time  when  the 
requirements  for  fiscal  accommodation  were still high.  As a result,  the  nominal 
discount  rate  on  short  term government  paper  increased  sharply  from  182 per  cent 
in  1993 to 591 per cent  in July  1993.  The rates have  since dropped  to around  40 
per  cent.  Such high  interest  rates undoubtedly  attracted  short  term  capital  inflows. 
Beginning  1994,  non-residents  were  allowed  to participate  in Treasury  Bills  and 
Government  bond  markets  without  restriction. 
Tanzania  Similar  to developments  in Zimbabwe  and Zambia,  significant 
progress  has been  achieved  in decontrolling  prices  in Tanzania.  The  exchange  and 
trade  regime  have  been extensively  liberalized.  Import  licensing  has been 
eliminated  and  exporters  are currently  permitted  to  100 per cent  retention  of  their 
foreign  exchange  receipts.  In order  to promote  dealings  in foreign  exchange, 
Tanzania  established  an interbank  foreign  exchange  market  in June  1994 and the 
bureaux  which  were  set up in  1992, are permitted  to participate  in the  interbank 
foreign  exchange  market.  This  was intended  to promote  competition  in the  foreign 
exchange  market  since  only  two banks  were registered  by then.  The  participation 
by  bureaux  in the  interbank  foreign  exchange  market  is to be reviewed  with  a view 
to limiting  their  operations  to cover  only  over the counter  transactions. 
Tanzania  has made significant  progress  in its privatization  programme.  By end 
1994,  a total  of about  95 out of 371 parastatals  had been divested  and 50 had been 
targeted  for  restructuring  or divesture  in  1995.  In a further  effort  to provide 
financial  support  to the economic  development  process,  Tanzania  is preparing  the 
ground-work  for  the establishment  of capital  markets.  However,  foreign  investors 
are  not yet  permitted  to participate  in the capital  market.  Capital  transfers  to all 
countries  are  still  subject  to approval  by the authorities. 
Kenya  made  substantial  progress  in liberalizing  its trade  regime  during  the  Kenva 
late  1980’s.  However,  insufficient  adjustment  of the exchange  rate made  the 
liberalization  process  unsustainable.  Whenever  import  demand  outpaced  supply  of 
foreign  exchange,  import  licensing  would  be tightened  as a means  of matching 
demand  and  supply  of foreign  exchange. 
The  failure  to sustain the reform  process continued  to characterize 
macroeconomic  management  in the first  3 years of the  1990’s.  In the  foreign --36  - 
exchange  market,  holders  of foreign  exchange  certificates  were permitted  to 
negotiate  premiums  in secondary  market  trading  which  created  a dual  system. 
This  was followed  by a revaluation  and foreign  exchange  rationing  system  which 
caused  substantial  losses to holders.  Additionally,  the economy  was characterized 
by rising  inflation,  from  13 per cent  in  1989 to a peak  of 46 per cent in 1993. 
Furthermore  efforts  to finance  the widening  budget  deficit  through  sale of 
Government  paper  pushed  interest  rates to very high  levels. 
Since  mid  1993, Kenya  has moved  very  fast in stabilizing  the macroeconomic 
environment  and liberalizing  the economy.  ‘Inflation  was brought  down  to single 
digit  levels.  An  interbank  foreign  exchange  system  was started  in October  1993. 
By end  of  1993,  all restrictions  on remittances  of dividends  and expatriate  earnings 
had  been  lifted  residents  were permitted  to borrow  abroad  up to $ lm.  In 
February  1994,  further  efforts  to eliminate  controls  on the capital  account  were 
announced.  Exporters  were allowed  100 per cent retention  of export  proceeds, 
limit  on  resident  borrowing  from  abroad  was removed,  foreigners  were allowed  to 
open  foreign  currency  accounts  in domestic  banks and the restrictions  on domestic 
borrowing  by  foreign  controlled  companies  was removed.  By June  1994, Kenya 
accepted  obligations  of Article  VIII  of Articles  of Agreements  of the IMF. 
In  the financial  year  1994/95,  Kenya  made further  progress  in reforming  the 
foreign  exchange  market  and liberalizing  the capital  account.  The Central  Bank of 
Kenya  started  licensing  foreign  exchange  bureaux  in October  1994.  In addition, 
residents  were  permitted  to invest  funds abroad  including  retaining  funds  in 
overseas  accounts.  Additionally  foreign  investors  were allowed  to participate  in 
the  Nairobi  Stock  Exchange.  In  1994, offshore  borrowings  by residents  were 
allowed  without  limit  provided  that interest  does not exceed  LIBOR plus 2 
percentage  points  and such borrowing  is not guaranteed  by Government. 
The  liberalization  of the foreign  exchange  and trade regime  in Uganda  Uganda 
extensively  discussed  in Kasekende  et al (1994)16.  The  new government  that 
came  into  power  in January  1986 took  almost  1% years  in search  of an 
appropriate  policy  package  to address the numerous  economic  problems  that 
is 
affected  Uganda.  During  that time, the policy  regime  was characterized  by a high 
degree  of uncertainty,  an overvalued  exchange  rate and very  high  inflation. 
Following  the launch  of the Economic  Recovery  Programme  in May  1987, 
insufficient  exchange  rate adjustment  and inefficient  budget  management 
undermined  the reform  programme.  However,  since  June  1990, Uganda  has 
moved  reasonably  quickly  to correct  macroeconomic  distortions.  Government 
I6 Section  II of the Uganda  Fiil  report as part of a wider  study  covering  five other African  Countries  under 
External  Finance  for Africa  Project  managed  by  Oxford  International. 37 
implemented  very  tight  monetary  and  fiscal  measures;  sanctioned  the establishment 
of  foreign  exchange  bureaux  in July  1990,  launched  a  foreign  exchange  auction 
system  in January  1993 and replaced  it with  an interbank  system  in November 
1993.  Under  the  interbank  system,  all  surrender  requirements  on exports  or any 
other  foreign  exchange  inflows  were removed.  In addition,  residents  are permitted 
to operate  foreign  currency  accounts.  During  the period  since  1990, government 
pursued  an aggressive  policy  of attracting  foreign  investment.  As part  of this 
process,  Uganda  enacted  a new Investment  Code with  highly  liberal  provisions  on 
repatriation  of capital  and dividends.  Since early  1993,  both  nominal  and real 
exchange  rates  have  appreciated  markedly  in part  reflecting  higher  private  capital 
inflows  and  terms  of trade.  The capital  account  is not  yet  fully  Iiberalised.  In 
1994,  Uganda  acceded  to Article  VIII  Sections  2,3  and 4 status of the Fund’s 
Articles  of Agreement.  ‘ 
South  Africa  According  to Mlambo  and  Nell  (1995),  South  Africa  has 
experienced  structural  disruptions  since  1970 that have  had a profound  impact  on 
investment  and  the overall  economic  performance  of the country.  The Angolan 
war,  oil  price  shocks  in the  1970’s,  the  worldwide  recession  by  the end of the 
1970’s,  sanctions  and political  instability  have  all combined  disrupted  the long-run 
growth  performance  of  the country. 
In  1980 there  was a sharp upsurge  in gold price  which  restored  investors’ 
confidence  and paved  the  way  for  major  policy  transformations.  By then,  the 
political  situation  in South  Africa  had  deteriorated  to such an extent  that foreign 
creditors  were  reluctant  to extend  further  credit  to domestic  enterprises  and other 
financial  institutions.  Disinvestment  campaigns  emanating  mainly  from  Western 
nations,  accompanied  by  stricter  trade  and financial  sanctions,  forced  the 
government  to declare  a debt moratorium  on foreign  debt  in  1985.  According  to 
Van der Walt  and De Wet,  1993  disinvestment  together  with  the repayment  of 
foreign  debt  contributed  to net capital  outflows  of around  R5 billion  per annum 
from  1985 onward. 
In  addition,  before  1985, the balance  of payments  (BOP) was characterized  by 
cyclical  patterns,  during  an upswing  in the business  cycle,  increased  demand  for 
imports  caused  the current  account  to move  into a deficit,  which  in turn  was 
financed  by  direct  and  indirect  capital  inflows.  During  a downswing,  imports 
declined,  and the current  account  moved  into a surplus’that  enabled  the repayment 
of  loans.  The  cyclical  pattern  of the  BOP was however  disrupted  by net capital 
outflows  which  occurred  after  1985.  Whereas  in the past current  account  deficits 
were  financed  by  capital  inflows,  net  outflows  that have  taken  place  since  1985 
implied  that  the current  account  had  to be transformed  into  a surplus. 
Broadly  speaking,  in contrast  to the  period  before  1985, the period  thereafter 
saw a sharp  increase  in the user cost  of capital  for public  enterprises  that 
subsequently  led to a sharp  decrease  in public  investment. Furthermore,  it is noteworthy  that because the level  of savings  was not enough  to 
finance  capital  outflows,  the significant  decline  in the GDITGDP  ratio  since  1985, 
eased the pressure  on the current  account  of the BOP. 
Developments  in the BOP constraint  have  had important  implications  for 
investment  in South Africa  since  1985. Subsequently,  real  growth  declined  to a 
mere  0.6  percent  per  annum  between  1985 and  1993.  Furthermore,  GDFI  as a 
percentage  of  GDP  (gross domestic  product)  declined  sharply  from  an average 
annual  rate of  28.6  percent  in the period  1970-1984,  to 21.2  percent  in the period 
1985-1993.  In  the same sub-periods,  private  investment  as a percentage  of GDP 
decreased  from  15.3 to  13.6 percent,  while *public investment  showed  a significant 
decline  from  13.3 to 7.6  percent.  Surprisingly,  the BOP constraint  appears  to 
have  had  a marginal  impact  on private  investment  inflows. 
With  the  breakdown  of the Bretton  Wood  system  in  1971, South Africa 
experimented  with various  exchange  rate systems  to accommodate  floating 
exchange  rates.  Following  the recommendations  of the  1978 Interim  Report  of the 
Commission  of Inquiry  into  the Monetary  System and Monetary  Policy,  South 
Africa  opted  for  a dual  managed  floating  exchange  rate system  in  1979, with 
substantial  intervention  by the  South African  Reserve  Bank.  The  high  gold price 
during  the  1970’s and early  1980’s contributed  to the exchange  rate being 
overvalued. 
In  1983 the Reserve  Bank allowed  the exchange  rate to be more  market- 
determined.  A direct  attempt  was made to drain  the economy  of excess liquidity 
with  the liberalization  of exchange  control  with the abolition  of the financial  rand 
mechanism  in February  1983  . This,  coupled  with  declining  gold prices  since 
1981; political  unrest  and disinvestment  contributed  to a sharp depreciation  of the 
exchange  rate.  Capital  outflows  since  1983, however,  necessitated  the 
reinstatement  of  the financial  rand  in  1985.  The depreciation  of the exchange  rate 
effectively  increased  the cost of  imported  capital  and subsequently  suppressed 
investment. 
Political  uncertainty  and the concomitant  macroeconomic  instability  that prevailed 
during  the  1970’s,  and particularly  after  1985,  increased  the risk  for potential 
investors  and  consequently  reduced  investment. 
South  Africa  formally  accepted  the obligations  of Article  VIII,  section  2,  3 and 4 
of the IMF’s  Articles  of Agreement  in September  1973. _.  .  -  --  ._  --  -3Y- 
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